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Abstract: 
Shortly after winning the 2016 Presidential Election, Donald Trump began announcing his 
Cabinet nominations. I examine cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for firms with political 
connections to Cabinet and some non-Cabinet level appointments. Nominee and stock 
characteristics are aggregated, and I find positive and significant CARs surrounding the 
announcement dates. Additionally, the traits of being a Cabinet nominee, being a board member, 
and having a narrow confirmation margin all significantly explain the CARs for various event 
windows and subgroups. The annualized CARs around the announcement date for these firms 
are often greater than 100% in excess of the market, providing strong evidence that political 
connections are highly sought after and rewarded by the market. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 On October 18, 2016, just a few weeks before the Presidential Election, Donald Trump 
tweeted, “I will Make Our Government Honest Again -- believe me. But first, I’m going to have 
to #DrainTheSwamp in DC” (Trump 2016). Since then, he has tweeted #DrainTheSwamp an 
additional 83 times, almost all of which were before the general election (Brown 2020). In this 
paper, I test the validity of this campaign promise and set out to determine, based on Cabinet and 
other high-level government positions, the breadth and depth of ties to companies for those 
nominated for these positions. While it is rare to find someone that has never worked in industry 
who is also qualified for a distinguished, government position, it seems reasonable that 
politicians would rank prior corporate ties as being less important than doing what is best for the 
people they represent.  
 It is not difficult to find evidence that politics and stock returns have a significant 
relationship. The STOCK Act was passed in 2012 to prevent congressmen and congresswomen 
from trading on material, nonpublic information that they acquired through their public service. 
Despite this bill preventing—or at least limiting—insider trading amongst America’s civil 
servants, it was amended around a year later to prevent trading disclosures to the general public. 
(Fernando 2020). There is also abundant literature highlighting the ties between political 
connections and various benefits, whether directly or indirectly related to government. Duchin 
and Sosyura (2012) show that firms who lobbied were not only more likely to receive assistance 
during the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) but that they also received more 
assistance than those who had not lobbied. These finding are further confirmed by Blau, Brough, 
and Thomas (2013). Blau (2017) also shows that firms that lobbied were more likely to receive 
emergency funding from the Federal Reserve during the financial crisis. Yu and Yu (2010) find 
that firms who lobby avoid detection for longer and are investigated less often by auditors. 
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Politically connected firms also have a lower cost of equity capital than those that are less 
connected, according to research by Boubakri, Guedhami, Mishra, Saffar (2012). Richter, 
Samphantharak, Timmons (2009) examine the relationship between effective tax rates and 
lobbying, finding that those who lobby more face a lower effective tax rate. Faccio (2006) shows 
that, “the announcement of a new political connection results in a significant increase in (firm) 
value”. This last statement motivates the tests in this study. In particular, I examine the stock 
price reaction of politically connected firms surrounding the Trump administration’s 
nominations. Given the existing literature, I expect that there will be statistically significant, 
abnormal stock returns for those companies who have political connections surrounding the day 
that the appointment is announced. 
 In testing this hypothesis, I attempt to identify the best ways to determine a corporate tie, 
how to measure the degree of a corporate tie, and how these ties show up in data. My first 
assumption is that the best metric for measuring a corporate tie is years worked for a company. 
In addition, some companies were bought out by larger firms or rebranded. I assume that these 
ties show up in the data of companies that made acquisitions, were rebranded, or were the parent 
company. It also seems valuable to determine how many years it has been since the nominees 
worked for these large companies. Surely working at Company A several decades ago would 
have a lesser impact than working at Company B within the last year. Finally, I make the 
assumption that the impact of these ties shows up in cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
surrounding the day that the nomination is announced for those firms that are publicly traded.  
 To calculate CARs, I utilized Eventus, a software program I accessed through Wharton 
Research Data Services. Eventus uses CRSP data (The Center for Research in Security Prices) to 
quickly run regressions calculating parameters from a daily market model for each company in 
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question. I can then examine discrepancies between the predicted and actual returns to see if they 
are statistically different from zero. In running preliminary regressions on a handful of 
companies, I procured results that were both economically and statistically significant. I then 
applied this method to the sample of available firms (with available data) that were connected to 
President Trump’s political appointments.  
 Results show that for Cabinet and non-Cabinet nominations, the average CAR for the 
five-day window surrounding the nomination announcement is 1.44%, with a p-value of .0030 
{4.2A}1. Even more surprising, there is statistically significant evidence that for Cabinet 
positions exclusively, news of the nominations leaked into the market prior to the official 
announcement. For these nominations, the average CAR for the two days prior to the 
announcement was .62% {4.3B}. This is evidence of strong form efficient markets, or markets 
that incorporate both public and non-public information into asset prices. It is also surprising to 
see just how much the market values having political connections, with some firms surging 5% 
or more when politically connected nominations are announced.   
 Taken together, the findings in this study have widespread and meaningful implications. 
First, it is useful to have a numeric value for how valuable political connections are. Second, it is 
noteworthy that many nominees spend significant time working for the same corporations and 
that these corporations have abnormal stock returns after the announcement and in the days 
leading up to it; evidence that individuals are trading on material, non-public information is 
disturbing but not surprising. While this behavior is good for markets from a price efficiency 
standpoint, it makes larger, more politically connected investors better off than their 
 
1 Throughout this paper, the locations of data presented will be reported as two numbers and a letter corresponding 
to the table, column, and panel, surrounded by curly brackets {}. For example, data found in Table 4, Column 2, 
Panel A is reported as {4.2A}. If data is found in all of column 2 or all of Panel A, it is presented as {4.2} or {4.A}. 
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counterparts. Third, it is alarming how many nominations went to individuals that had spent prior 
years—or decades—working for firms that were under the jurisdiction of the agency they would 
soon regulate2.   
2. DATA 
 The most useful sources of data in my research are Wikipedia and Twitter (specifically, 
http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com). Wikipedia has aggregated every Cabinet nomination by 
listing the name of the individual, the position of appointment, the announcement date, the 
Senate committee vote date, the Senate committee vote, the full Senate vote date, and the full 
Senate vote. In the case that a nomination was withdrawn or that an individual withdrew himself 
or herself from consideration, this information is also provided. Wikipedia also lists some of this 
information for non-Cabinet members, particularly the more prominent nominees and those 
nominated for the more important roles. To validate most of this data, Wikipedia provides 
linked, external sources. When citing sources, I cite the original source of information, but 
highlight here the usefulness of Wikipedia.  
 A few changes have been necessary for the data to be useable. First, in instances where 
the announcement date falls on a weekend, holiday, or is announced after market close, the 
announcement date has been changed to the next available trading day, as that is likely when the 
market incorporates this new information. Twitter is particularly useful for determining exactly 
when announcements are made, as each tweet has a timestamp. Many announcements are also 
made via whitehouse.gov, but these webpages typically aren’t still available when I attempt to 
retrieve the information. Again, Wikipedia has been incredibly helpful by providing archived 
 
2 For an in-depth review and analysis of regulatory capture, revolving doors, informational lobbying, and other 
empirical work on related topics, please see Dal Bó (2006). 
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webpages. I also utilize news articles when unable to find another source of information. In these 
instances, I attempt to find at least two articles and use the time stamp of the earliest one.  
 There is also substantial information on Wikipedia regarding most nominees’ work 
history, again including multiple links to outside sources verifying the information. It makes for 
an excellent starting point to find the corporations most closely tied to nominees. My search has 
also led me to The Center for Responsive Politics, a group that is “the nation's premier research 
group tracking money in U.S. politics and its effect on elections and public policy” (“About 
Open Secrets”). Prominent members of Congress, lobbyists, and other government officials have 
their employment histories listed on opensecrets.org, and distinctions are made whether this time 
was spent in the private sector, a federal, state, or local government position, or working for a 
lobbying firm. Their so called “revolving door” details timelines for these individuals as they 
move in and out of public office and the private sector—though that distinction is becoming 
more blurred. One potential issue with using data from this site is that there are relatively few 
citations. Furthermore, the dates regarding employment only specify the year started and the year 
ended, so there may be variations as great as 1 year in either direction with regards to actual 
tenure in these positions3. I believe that this difference will be negligible on average.  
  I follow a much less rigid set of rules for determining which nominees to include in the 
non-Cabinet positions. There have been roughly 5914 nominations done since President Trump 
took office, and not all of these are particularly notable (“Trump Nominations Tracker” 2020). 
For example, considering that I have never heard of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 
I exclude this non-Cabinet position. The nominees that I include are those of whom I have heard 
 
3 For example, working from December 31, 2010 to January 1, 2011 would show 2010-2011 (1 year), whereas 
working January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2010 would show 2010-2010 (0 years), even though the latter instance is 
a full year and the first instance is only one day. 
4 As of March 31, 2020 
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and are nominated for a position of which I have heard or those that were confirmed by a small 
margin (less than 10 votes). The reasoning behind the second qualifier is that a small vote margin 
signals that the position is important enough to require a Senate vote and that enough people 
think either 1) he or she is unqualified, or 2) there is a conflict of interest. I concede that this isn’t 
the most rigorous methodology, but I believe that it is acceptable given the potential volume of 
meaningless data. 
3. UNIVARIATE RESULTS 
a. CARs and Cabinet Level 
 I find that for all nominees, there is a statistically and economically significant abnormal 
stock returns for multiple time windows before and after the announcement date. The most 
statistically significant interval is the window two days prior to the announcement up through 
two days post-announcement. The CAR for this window is 1.44% and has a p-value of .0030 
{4.3A}. While 1.44% may not seem like a lot, this equates to an annualized return of 72.6% in 
excess of the market (or 106% if compounded every 5-day period). The CARs for the windows 
of (0,1) and (0,2) are also statistically significant at the 5% level {4.4A, 4.5A}, and the CAR for 
the (0,5) window is significant at the 10% level {4.6A}. These returns, annualized, equate to 
94.5%, 98.3%, and 35%, respectively.  
 The abnormal returns are even more pronounced when examining just those who are 
nominated for Cabinet positions. Again, the most statistically significant time window is from 
two days prior to the announcement up through two days after the announcement. This window’s 
CAR is 2.35% (118% annualized, 222% compounded annualized), and the p-value is .0002 
{4.2B}. While there are only 21 degrees of freedom for this dataset, the p-value is sufficiently 
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small. The windows (0,1) and (0,2) were again significant at the 5% level and have annualized 
CARs of 164% and 145% {4.4B, 4.5B}. 
 Interestingly, the CAR for the period beginning two days before the announcement up 
through one day before the announcement is also statistically significant at the 10% level 
{4.3B}. While a 10% significance level is typically not rigorous enough to reject the null 
hypothesis, I believe that this provides enough evidence that there was trading on material, non-
public information in the days leading up to Cabinet announcements given that this information 
would have been privy to only a few individuals. Perhaps not enough people—that is, traders 
with sufficient capital to make a pronounced swing in the market price of these stocks—knew 
about the information in advance to cause a more statistically significant price shift. Given the 
limitations of the dataset, I believe that a 10% significance level is sufficient for this claim. 
 Abnormal stock returns for non-Cabinet nominations are not statistically significant for 
any time window, nor would they be economically significant {4.C}. Again, the lack of a larger 
dataset may be the cause for not having more pronounced results, or it may just be that not all of 
these positions are influential enough for the market to price in a firm-specific benefit. It may 
also be the case that not all of the nominees are as recognized, distinguished in their prior 
careers, or specifically tied to one firm. 
b. CARs and Seniority 
I also explore various CARs for nominee subgroups based on their positions within past 
firms. Specifically, I consider if they were a C-level executive at any point, if they served on the 
board of directors, if they meet either one of these criteria, if they meet both of these criteria, or 
if they meet neither. The results are quite varied. The only group that doesn’t have any windows 
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that are significant is those that were neither a C-level executive nor a board member {5.E}. This 
is not surprising. 
 The most statistically significant group is those who were either a C-level executive or a 
board member in their time with the firm {5.C}. This may be partially due to the relatively 
higher degrees of freedom (28 compared to 14, 13, 7, and 5 in the other subgroups). Regardless, 
the (-2,-1) and (0,5) windows {5.3C, 5.6C} are significant at the 10% level (with annualized 
returns of 62% and 43%, respectively), the (0,1) window {5.4C} is significant at the 5% level 
(annualized return of 129%), and the (-2,2) and (0,2) windows {5.2C, 5.5C} are significant at the 
1% level (returns of 104% and 129%). Between those two qualifiers, it seems that the market 
values being a former board member more than having been an executive. The p-values for 5 of 
the 6 windows are smaller for board members, and the CARs are larger for 4 of the 6 windows. 
Board member CARs are statistically significant at the 1% level for two windows, (-2,2) and 
(0,2), and at the 10% level for one window, (0,5); C-level CARs are significant at the 5% level 
for two windows, (-2,2) and (0,2), and the 10% level for one window, (0,1).  
 Finally, those that were both formerly an executive and a board member at some point for 
the same firm have the largest CARs in almost every window compared to other groups. 
Unfortunately, as there are only 8 of these individuals, it is difficult to obtain statistical 
significance. Only two windows are statistically significant, the (-2,2) window and the (0,2) 
window (at the 1% and the 5% level, respectively) {5.2D, 5.5D}. The CAR for the (0,2) window 
is the largest of the entire group, having a 3-day return of 2.20%, or an annualized return of 
185% in excess of the market {5.5D}. The (-2,2) window was also economically meaningful, 
with a 5-day excess return of 3.03%, or 153% annualized {5.2D}. Clearly, there is strong 
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evidence that the market values firms where a former board member and/or executive is 
nominated for a position in government.  
c. CARs and Tenure at the Firm 
 The results related to the tenure of nominees at former companies are unintuitive. For 
almost every window (all but [-5,5]) in Table 6, the CAR is greater for those who spent 5 or 
fewer years at the firm compared to those who were there for more than 5 years. While the 
difference between the two means is not statistically significant, it is interesting that the market 
doesn’t value how long nominees spent at prior firms. There is also no statistically significant 
difference in means between the subgroup of those who spent 10 or fewer years at their 
respective firms and those who spent more than 10 years with them. One potential explanation is 
that there are increasing marginal returns for each additional year spent at a firm but that the 
minimum for this phenomenon is past the 10-year mark. If this is the case, we could see evidence 
of increasing returns for each additional year after reaching the minimum, meaning that we 
wouldn’t see the effect in either of our testing groups. However, in the regressions testing this 
hypothesis, the sign of Tenure2 is negative, not positive, showing decreasing marginal returns as 
tenure increases5. 
d. CARs and Time Away from the Firm 
 The trend in CARs related to how long it has been since nominees were associated with a 
firm is also surprising. In almost every case, there is a larger CAR for the subgroup of those that 
left their firm longer ago than those that left more recently {Table 7}. The only exception to this 
is a slight, not-statistically-significant difference in the (-2,-1) window {7.3C, 7.6C}. Intuition 
suggests that the market rewards companies whose former employees have left more recently to 
 
5 Throughout all of the multivariate tests that I ran, neither of these variables was statistically or economically 
significant. Therefore, the models referenced here are not included in any of the tables. 
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fill political vacancies, but the data do not support this idea. One hypothesis may be that those 
who left more than 5 years ago were in those positions for a longer time, on average, than those 
that had left more recently. However, I do not find that this is the case either: the mean tenure for 
those who left less than 5 years ago is 15.6 years, compared to 9 years for those who left more 
than 5 years ago. Further research could be done in this area.  
e. CARs and Vote Margin 
 The initial research question in this study is: Is there evidence that firms are perceived to 
benefit from having former employees, executives, and/or board members appointed to positions 
within the government? An underlying question that motivates my tests is whether firms benefit 
because of favorable legislation. This, in turn, begs the question: if legislation is passed, is it 
done so to benefit the American people, or the firm? This topic of “corruption” and being able to 
measure it is a major factor I want to isolate and analyze. One proxy for corruption that I test is 
the vote margin, or the difference between the number of Senate votes in favor of a nominee 
being confirmed and against the confirmation. During the Trump presidency, there have been 53 
Republican senators, 45 Democratic senators, and 2 Independents, though it is worth noting that 
both Independents caucus with the Democratic Party (“List of Current United States Senators” 
2020). Because of this, any vote that is 55-45 or closer can be considered mostly along party 
lines (both Independents siding with the majority, Republicans), and a vote of 53-47 is strictly 
along party lines (Republican majority vs. all others). I create a dummy variable for having a 10 
vote or smaller confirmation margin to test for “corruptness”. The inherent assumption is that 
any nominee that has full opposition of the minority party is viewed as incompetent, having a 
conflict of interest, or otherwise unfit for the position. It seems reasonable that if such an 
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individual is pushed through and nominated regardless, there are other factors involved in their 
confirmation, such as corporate ties. 
 One limitation is that there are only 6 individuals who were confirmed by 10 votes or 
fewer. Despite the lack of data, there are significant differences between the CARs of those who 
were narrowly confirmed and the rest. For the (-2,2) window for those who were narrowly 
confirmed {8.2A}, the CAR is an astonishing 4.20% in excess of the market (212% annualized), 
greater than any other window or subgroup examined thus far. The p-value for this window is a 
strongly significant .0003. The results for other windows are even more extreme. For narrow 
confirmations for the (0,1) and (0,2) windows {8.4A, 8.5A}, the CARs are 3.30% and 3.95%, 
respectively. These are annualized excess returns of 416% and 332% (not including 
compounding). Furthermore, I test for a difference between means and find statistically 
significant results. The (-2,2) window is significant at the 1% level, and the (0,1) and (0,2) 
windows are significant at the 5% level. I conclude that there is strong evidence that the market 
rewards firms with ties to controversial nominations. I also check for differences in the CARs 
when there is a 20 vote or smaller margin. However, I do not find any statistically significant 
differences {8.F}. It is also worth noting that over half (14 of 26) of the nominees requiring a 
Senate vote were confirmed by a margin of 20 votes or fewer.  
4. MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION MODEL 
 In this section, I discuss a series of tests where I estimate various multifactor models 
using both nominee information and firm characteristics. Using the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP), I obtain data of share code price (Price), trade volume (in number of 
shares traded daily) (Volume), the highest asking price during the announcement date (AskHi), 
the lowest bid price during the announcement date (BidLo), closing bid price (Bid), closing ask 
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price (Ask), and shares outstanding (SharesOut). I then calculate market capitalization (MktCap), 
the logarithm of market cap (LogMktCap), daily volatility (Volatility) (ln(AskHi) - ln(BidLo)), 
and percent spread (Spread) (Ask - Bid)/((Ask + Bid) / 2). In order to have the results of Spread 
and Volatility make more sense, I take the percent spread and multiply it by 1000; a one unit 
increase in spread corresponds to a 1000% increase in spread, and a measurement of 1 for spread 
means that the difference between the bid and ask price is 1/1000th of a percent. Volatility is 
multiplied by 100. The nominee-specific information includes the number of years since they 
have worked for a firm (YearsSince), if the margin of confirmation is 10 votes or fewer 
(VoteDifLessThan10), if they served on a board (Board), if they were formerly a C-level 
executive (C_Level), and if they were nominated to a Cabinet position (Cabinet).  
 To begin testing my hypothesis in a multivariate framework, I included all of the 
variables that I thought would be relevant, examined the results, and iterated; if a variable was 
extremely insignificant, I ran another regression without it and compared the adjusted R2s. 
However, if I believed that a variable was still important to have in the model (for example, to 
show that stock price doesn’t affect predicted CARs), I elected to keep it in the model. Since the 
(-2,2) CAR window generally had the largest value and greatest statistical significance, this was 
the window I used to estimate all of my models. I also experimented with different interaction 
terms after settling on the variables of interest. Additionally, due to the small size of the data set, 
I was concerned about heteroskedasticity. I ran a White test for each model and found that there 
was not significant enough evidence (p = ~0.2) to reject the null hypothesis that the data is 
homoskedastic. However, for the sake of thoroughness, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
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for my multivariate models are reported in Table 106. After extensive trial and error, the model 
that best explains the abnormal stock returns is as follows and in column [3] of the Table 9: 
CAR-2,2 = ß0 + ß1(Volume) + ß2(LogMktCap) + ß3(Board) + ß4(Cabinet) + ß5(YearsSince) + ß6(Board * Cabinet) + 
ß7(C_Level) + ß8(VoteDifLessThan10) +        
The variable of strongest significance throughout every multifactor model I test is 
Cabinet; Cabinet is significant at even the 1% level in every regression. It also is very 
economically significant, having an estimated CAR between 3.3% and 4.2% for the (-2,2) 
window. This makes intuitive sense, as Cabinet positions are the most senior within each 
division of the federal government and will naturally be able to exert the most influence in policy 
decisions.  
 Having a vote margin of 10 or less is also significant at the 5% level in two of the three 
models {9.3, 9.4}. The CAR for this variable ranges from 2.1% to 2.3%. This, also, makes 
intuitive sense: if nominees are viewed as more likely to favor firms they have worked for, we 
expect to see a narrower confirmation margin. It seems like political opposition by the minority 
party is an indicator for “playing favorites” in the private sector—or, at least, the market rewards 
firms as such. Board is also significant at the 5% level, and it has an even larger estimated 
coefficient: 3.7% of the predicted CAR can be attributed to Board {9.3}. While this is more 
significant in columns [1] and [2] of Table 9, it becomes less significant as additional variables 
are added to the model in columns [4] and [5]. 
 Volume and LogMktCap are also significant, though only at the 10% level in column [3] 
of Table 9. For each additional million shares traded, the CAR is predicted to increase by .038%. 
Intuitively, when more trading is done surrounding the announcement as the market rushes to 
 
6 For clarity, the conclusions drawn from the p-values throughout the multivariate model discussion all come from 
the non-robust standard errors. 
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incorporate the new information, the more the expected CAR should deviate. Volume is 
significant at the 10% level in four of the five multifactor models in Table 9. Future papers 
examining this topic could explore the relationship between dollar-volume and CARs instead of 
share volume.  
 The relationship between CARs and the logarithm of the stocks’ market capitalization 
varies greatly. When I only include a few other variables, as in columns [1] and [2] of Table 9, 
LogMktCap is significant at even the 1% level. It also has a reasonable impact on the predicted 
CAR, decreasing by about 1.5% for each unit increase in LogMktCap. As the values for 
LogMktCap vary from 8.5 to 11.5, there is a potential difference of 4.5% between the smallest 
and largest firm. However, by the time all variables of interest have been added, it is no longer 
significant at any level. This is likely indicative of LogMktCap being a proxy for the other 
variables when they are excluded from the model (i.e. the actual effects of the other variables are 
correlated with LogMktCap, so when they are excluded, their effects “show up” in LogMktCap. 
This issue of multicollinearity is discussed later).  
Finally, YearsSince, (Board * Cabinet), C_Level, Price, Spread, and Volatility are all 
statistically insignificant individually and jointly. I run an F test to test for joint insignificance 
and the p-value is .555. This means that I fail to reject the null that they are all jointly equal to 
zero. It is surprising that being a former executive in a company is not a good predictor of 
abnormal stock returns surrounding the nomination announcement. In fact, in none of the 
regressions that I run is C_Level statistically significant, and even if it were, the effect would be 
less than .2%. Additionally, I initially believed that the less time a nominee had been away from 
the firm, the more significant the CAR would be. The data, however, show that this does not 
seem to make a difference. In fact, in only one of the models {9.2} is there a level of significance 
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(10%), and it indicates the opposite relationship, that the gains to a firm are increased the longer 
a nominee has been absent from the firm. If this is the case, though, it only makes a difference of 
.1% for every 10 years they have been gone. 
One issue particularly prevalent in finance is multicollinearity. In order to ensure that my 
results are robust and consistent, I create two additional multivariate models where I 
intentionally omit important variables. This allows me to see if the remaining variables of 
interest are still significant or if they were just highly correlated with the omitted variables. In 
short, I attempt to find a balance between issues with multicollinearity and omitted variable bias. 
I make two additional tables (Tables 11 and 12), one where none of the models has 
VoteDifLessThan10, and one where none of the models has Board, Cabinet, or the interaction 
term between the two. The model that best explains the data without having VoteDifLessThan10 
is the following: 
CAR-2,2 = ß0 + ß1(Board) + ß2(Cabinet) + ß3(Board * Cabinet) + ß4(YearsSince) + ß5(C_Level) + ß6(Volume) + 
ß7(LogMktCap) +       [2] 
 For these regressions, I observe similar results to those mentioned above with a few small 
differences. Like in prior regressions, Cabinet is the most statistically and economically 
significant variable across all models tested. LogMktCap and Board are also still statistically 
significant, but both are even more so than in previous models {11.5}. In fact, Board becomes 
more and more significant as variables are added to the model, increasing from the 10% level to 
the 5% level. LogMktCap has a p-value less than .01 in the model with the most predictive power 
{11.4}. The interaction term is again insignificant. Generally speaking, the R2s are smaller than 
the first set of models, but this is expected as I am intentionally omitting an important variable. 
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Lastly, I estimate models that exclude Cabinet, Board, and the interaction term between 
them to see how VoteDifLessThan10 and the other remaining variables are affected. The most 
predictive model of those I test is: 
CAR-2,2 = ß0 + ß1(VoteDifLessThan10) + ß2(Volume) + ß3(LogMktCap) + ß4(YearsSince) + ß5(Price) + ß6(Spread) 
+ ß7(Volatility) +        
 The coefficient on VoteDifLessThan10 is larger than in the previous models that I have 
estimated by a significant margin: the most predictive model has a coefficient of 2.81 vs. 2.36 in 
earlier models {12.4}. Volume is also significant at the 5% level instead of the 10% level (or not 
at all, as in most earlier models), and Spread is significant at the 5% level {12.4}. The coefficient 
on Spread indicates that for every 1 unit increase in the percent spread (which is actually every 
1000% increase in the percent spread), there is a predicted decrease in the CAR of 3.2%. Perhaps 
in extreme cases where the spread is so wide, market participants conclude that the liquidity and 
transaction costs aren’t worth trading the security, and thus we see a predicted decrease in the 
CAR. Again, since I am knowingly omitting important variables for these models, it is difficult 
to say exactly why this result is showing up. 
 What remains consistent across all models, omitted variables or not, robust standard 
errors or not, is that Cabinet is statistically significant at the 1% level and has an estimated 
coefficient ranging from 2.74 to 4.37. Board is generally significant at the 5% or 1% level, with 
estimated values between 1.62 and 4.10. Volume also is generally significant at the 5% or 1% 
level, but at the mean value of 11.7 million shares, the predicted effect on the CAR is only 0.43. I 
conclude that trade volume isn’t a large predictor of CARs. VoteDifLessThan10 is almost always 
significant at the 5% level whenever included in the model and adds an estimated 2.18 to 3.24 to 
the CAR. LogMktCap ranges from being significant at the 1% level to not being significant at all, 
  
18 
so I am unable to draw definite conclusions. Perhaps there is a lack of data, or perhaps 
multicollinearity is at play. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Consistent with my hypothesis and the empirical work of others, I find that having 
political connections is a trait highly valued by the market. Firms that have a former board 
member and/or are nominated for a Cabinet position exhibit statistically and economically 
significant cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the day of the announcement. Furthermore, 
firms with connections to nominees for Cabinet positions exhibit statistically significant 
abnormal returns for the 2-day period in advance of the announcement, providing curious 
evidence of insider trading. Across multiple time horizons and subgroups of nominees, former 
board membership and/or having a narrow vote confirmation margin were also determining 
factors. Interestingly, prior tenure with a firm and time away from the firm do not provide 
predictive power of a firm’s CAR. The multifactor models that I test generally show Cabinet and 
VoteDifLessThan10 are strongly significant and Volume and LogMktCap are weakly significant 
(10% significance level).  
The results in this study are important for a myriad of reasons. First, they reiterate 
findings that that the market values political connections. The results serve as a backdrop for 
analyzing if politicians are working for the good of the people they serve or others, such as 
former employers or friends. These results also provide evidence of insider trading, an illegal and 
unethical practice. Further questions that I would like to examine are: 
(i) Would I find similar results for individuals that were nominated for government 
positions and had worked for lobbying firms in the past? 
  
19 
(ii) If so, are these results dependent on the firms and/or market sectors that they 
lobbied for? 
(iii) Would I find similar results during the presidencies of Obama, Bush, or Clinton? 
If not, is this the result of less efficient markets, less corruption, or less value 
associated with political connectedness? 
(iv) Are advance movements in stock prices limited to political appointments, or is 
there evidence for CARs surrounding tweets about major news, such as trade 
deals, executive orders, military actions, etc.? 
In short, having political connections is, for better or worse, a trait highly valued by the market. 
There are a variety of ways to examine and measure this, and I have shown evidence of this via 
one metric of connectedness. As for the promise to #DrainTheSwamp, I have yet to find 
evidence for that claim. 
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Table 1 – Stock Summary Statistics 
This table reports statistics that summarize my data for stock-related characteristics. Price is the closing price of the 
stock on the announcement date or, if the announcement date didn’t fall on a trading day, the closing price on the 
next market trading day. AskHi is the highest asking price throughout the day of the announcement. BidLo is the 
lowest bid price throughout the announcement date. Bid is the closing bid price, and Ask is the closing ask price. 
Volume is the trade volume, in millions of shares, on the announcement date. SharesOut is the number of shares 
outstanding for each stock, in thousands. MktCap is the market capitalization of each firm, in USD. LogMktCap is 
the natural logarithm of the market capitalization for each firm. Volatility is calculated as the natural log of AskHi 
minus the natural log of BidLo. Spread is (Ask – Bid) / ((Ask + Bid) / 2). 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation Min Median Max 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Price 76.57 81.31 4.64 49.62 354.13 
AskHi 77.17 81.92 4.77 49.69 355.65 
BidLo 75.92 80.49 4.58 49.15 347.47 
Bid 76.57 81.31 4.63 49.61 354.04 
Ask 76.58 81.31 4.64 49.62 354.05 
Volume 11.686 22.581 0.144 3.075 114.216 
SharesOut 1,716,576 2,560,856 38,455 439,343 10,123,845 
MktCap 84,898,878,950 96,614,319,313 424,089,285 52,066,488,206 383,900,845,533 
LogMktCap 10.465 0.811 8.627 10.717 11.584 
Volatility 0.01836 0.00974 0.00668 0.01622 0.04515 
Spread 0.40751 0.51549 0.02819 0.20303 2.22466 
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Table 2 - Nominee Summary Statistics 
This table reports statistics that summarize my data for nominee-specific characteristics. For all dummy variables, 1 
corresponds to “yes” and 0 corresponds to “no”. C_Level is a dummy variable for whether or not the nominee was a 
former c-level executive, such as CEO, CFO, CIO, COO, CTO, etc. Note that a “yes” doesn’t necessarily mean that 
all of their time was spent as a c-level executive, just that they were, at some point in their time with the firm, a c-
level executive. Board is a dummy variable indicating if the nominee served on the board of directors for the 
company. Cabinet is a dummy variable for if the individual was nominated for a Cabinet-level position or not. 
Tenure is the total amount of time, in years, that each nominee spent working for the firm. YearsSince is the number 
of years since they have worked for the firm. LessThan5Since and LessThan10Since are both dummy variables for if 
they worked for the firm more recently than 5 or fewer years or 10 or fewer years, respectively. MoreThan5At and 
MoreThan10At are dummy variables for if they worked at the company for more than 5 years or more than 10 years, 
respectively. VotesFor and VotesAgainst are the number of Senate votes in favor of their confirmation and opposed 
to their confirmation, respectively. On average, this number is out of 97. VoteDif is the number of votes against their 
confirmation subtracted off of the number of votes for their confirmation. This is, at a theoretical minimum, equal to 
1 or greater. VoteDifLessThan10 is a dummy variable corresponding to having a majority of 10 votes or fewer. 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation Min Median Max 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
C_Level 0.4 0.497 0 0 1 
Board 0.429 0.502 0 0 1 
Cabinet 0.629 0.49 0 1 1 
Tenure 12.6 10.852 2 8 42 
YearsSince 10.657 10.178 0 5 37 
LessThan5Since 0.543 0.505 0 1 1 
LessThan10Since 0.571 0.502 0 1 1 
MoreThan5At 0.829 0.382 0 1 1 
MoreThan10At 0.429 0.502 0 0 1 
VotesFor 68.071 17.418 50 58 98 
VotesAgainst 29 17.116 1 41 47 
VoteDif 39.071 34.374 6 17 97 
VoteDifLessThan10 0.214 0.418 0 0 1 
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Table 3 - Correlation Coefficients 
Here are listed the correlation coefficients, bounded between -1 and 1, of the important variables of interest.  Certain dummy variables were excluded because of 
space and relevance. 
 
 
  Price Volume SharesOut MktCap LogMktCap Volatility Spread C_Level Board Cabinet Tenure YearsSince VoteDif 
Price 1.00             
Volume -0.22 1.00            
SharesOut -0.23 0.89 1.00           
MktCap 0.26 0.45 0.68 1.00          
LogMktCap 0.43 0.37 0.57 0.81 1.00         
Volatility -0.21 -0.07 -0.22 -0.27 -0.61 1.00        
Spread -0.45 0.10 -0.04 -0.34 -0.55 0.76 1.00       
C_Level -0.21 -0.15 -0.25 -0.24 -0.38 0.34 0.34 1.00      
Board -0.10 -0.19 -0.17 0.00 -0.11 0.07 -0.05 0.47 1.00     
Cabinet 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.15 0.13 -0.05 -0.21 -0.34 -0.17 1.00    
Tenure 0.26 -0.25 -0.24 0.11 -0.05 0.03 -0.20 0.01 0.06 0.31 1.00   
YearsSince -0.35 0.56 0.62 0.22 0.15 -0.12 0.13 -0.25 -0.43 -0.10 -0.36 1.00  
VoteDif 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.08 -0.46 -0.39 0.41 0.04 0.21 1.00 
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Table 4 - Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Cabinet Dummy 
Table 4 lists the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for various times windows and is subdivided by whether the 
individual was appointed to a Cabinet position or not. A CAR window of (-5,5) corresponds to the cumulative 
abnormal return for the period 5 trading days prior to the nomination announcement up through 5 trading days after 
the announcement. An abnormal return is computed by running regressions calculating parameters from a daily 
market model for each company in question, and the difference between the actual return and the model return for 
the time period is the cumulative abnormal return. I then test for statistical significance of these abnormal returns. 
Panel A lists the CARs and p-values for all nominees, Panel B shows the CARs and p-values for those strictly 
appointed to Cabinet positions, and Panel C is for those strictly appointed to non-Cabinet positions. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 CAR(-5,5) CAR(-2,2) CAR(-2,-1) CAR(0,1) CAR(0,2) CAR(0,5) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Panel A. All Nominations 
Mean 0.0022 0.0144*** 0.0027 0.0074** 0.0117** 0.0083* 
t-statistic (df = 34) (0.33) (2.93) (0.93) (1.79) (2.43) (1.46) 
       
Panel B. Cabinet Members 
Mean 0.0050 0.0235*** 0.0062* 0.0130** 0.0173*** 0.0085 
t-statistic (df = 21) (0.71) (4.20) (1.54) (2.47) (2.84) (1.28) 
       
Panel C. Non-Cabinet Members 
Mean -0.0027 -0.0011 -0.0032 -0.0021 0.0021 0.0080 
t-statistic (df = 12) (-0.20) (-0.14) (-0.92) (-0.35) (0.29) (0.74) 
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Table 5 - Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Seniority 
Table 5 lists the CARs for various time windows and is subdivided by the nominees’ roles during their time with 
their respective firms. For clarification on interpreting the windows or the CARs, please see the description for 
Table 4.  
Panel A lists the CARs and p-values for those who worked in a c-level position while with the firm. Panel B lists 
those who were a board member. Panel C lists those who were either a c-level executive, a board member, or both 
during their time with the company. Panel D lists only those who were both a c-level executive and a member of the 
board. Finally, Panel E lists those who worked in neither of these capacities. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 CAR(-5,5) CAR(-2,2) CAR(-2,-1) CAR(0,1) CAR(0,2) CAR(0,5) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Panel A. C-Level Executive 
Mean 0.0018 0.0170** -0.0002 0.0128* 0.0172** 0.0052 
t-stat (df = 13) (0.15) (2.13) (-0.04) (1.74) (2.35) (0.58) 
       
Panel B. Board Member 
Mean 0.0098 0.0210*** 0.0049 0.0061 0.0162*** 0.0149* 
t-statistic (df = 14) (0.93) (3.02) (1.23) (1.13) (2.77) (1.64) 
       
Panel C. Either C-Level Executive or Board Member 
Mean 0.0084 0.0204*** 0.0049* 0.0102** 0.0154*** 0.0102* 
t-statistic (df = 28) (1.20) (4.12) (1.51) (2.29) (3.10) (1.68) 
       
Panel D. Both C-Level Executive and Board Member 
Mean 0.0020 0.0303*** 0.0083 0.0104 0.0220** 0.0144 
t-statistic (df = 7) (0.18) (3.45) (1.36) (1.33) (2.62) (1.19) 
       
Panel E. Neither C-Level Executive nor Board Member 
Mean -0.0277 -0.0146 -0.0081 -0.0060 -0.0064 -0.0001 
t-statistic (df = 5) (-1.96) (-1.51) (-1.89) (-0.59) (-0.51) (-0.04) 
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Table 6 - Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Tenure with Firm 
Table 6 lists the CARs for various time windows and is subdivided by dummy variables for how long the nominees 
worked for their respective firms. For clarification on interpreting the windows or the CARs, please see the 
description for Table 4. 
Panel A lists the CARs and p-values for those who worked 5 years or fewer for the firm. Panel B lists the same 
information but for those who spent more than 5 years with the firm. Panel C tests the difference between the means 
in Panels A and B to see if it is statistically significant using Welch’s t-test. Panel D lists the means for those who 
worked 10 years or fewer for the firm, and Panel E for those who spent more than 10 years. Panel F tests the 
difference in the means of Panels D and E using Welch’s t-test. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 CAR(-5,5) CAR(-2,2) CAR(-2,-1) CAR(0,1) CAR(0,2) CAR(0,5) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Panel A. Less Than 5 Years at Company 
Mean 0.0095 0.0188 0.0053 0.0044 0.0135 0.0031 
t-statistic (df = 5) (0.46) (1.13) (0.84) (0.33) (0.72) (0.14) 
Panel B. More Than 5 Years at Company 
Mean 0.0007 0.0135*** 0.0022 0.0080** 0.0113*** 0.0094** 
t-statistic (df = 28) (0.09) (2.70) (0.66) (1.86) (2.48) (1.73) 
Panel C. Difference Between Panels A and B 
Mean 0.0088 0.0053 0.0032 -0.0036 0.0022 -0.0063 
t-statistic (5.6 < df < 8.0) (0.41) (0.31) (0.44) (-0.26) (0.11) (-0.28) 
Panel D. Less Than 10 Years at Company 
Mean 0.0080 0.0135** 0.0010 0.0046 0.0125** 0.0142* 
t-statistic (df = 19) (0.78) (2.01) (0.24) (0.88) (1.87) (1.60) 
Panel E. More Than 10 Years at Company 
Mean -0.0057 0.0155** 0.0050 0.0111* 0.0105* 0.0005 
t-statistic (df = 14) (-0.82) (2.11) (1.19) (1.64) (1.50) (0.09) 
Panel F. Difference Between Panels D and E 
Mean 0.0137 -0.0020 -0.0040 -0.0065 0.0020 0.0137 
t-statistic (28.4 < df < 32.0) (1.10) (-0.20) (-0.68) (0.76) (-0.20) (1.28) 
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Table 7- Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Time Away from Firm 
Table 7 lists the CARs for various time windows and is subdivided by dummy variables for how long it has been 
since the nominees worked for their respective firms. For clarification on interpreting the windows or the CARs, 
please see the description for Table 4. 
Panel A lists the CARs and p-values for those for whom it has been 5 years or fewer that they have been away from 
the firm. Panel B lists CARs and p-values for those who have been gone for more than 5 years. Panel C tests the 
difference between the means in Panels A and B to see if it is statistically significant using Welch’s t-test. Panels D, 
E, and F correspond to A, B, and C, respectively, except that the groups are divided by 10 years instead of 5. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
 
 CAR(-5,5) CAR(-2,2) CAR(-2,-1) CAR(0,1) CAR(0,2) CAR(0,5) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Panel A. Less Than 5 Years Since Left Company 
Mean 0.0001 0.0099** 0.0033 0.0028 0.0066* 0.0048 
t-statistic (df = 18) (0.01) (1.87) (1.00) (0.63) (1.35) (0.78) 
Panel B. More Than 5 Years Since Left Company 
Mean 0.0047 0.0197** 0.0020 0.0129** 0.0177** 0.0125 
t-statistic (df = 15) (0.39) (2.26) (0.39) (1.76) (2.04) (1.22) 
Panel C. Difference Between Panels A and B 
Mean -0.0046 -0.0098 0.0013 -0.0100 -0.0110 -0.0076 
t-statistic (24.0 < df < 26.0) (-0.33) (-0.96) (0.21) (-1.18) (-1.11) (-0.64) 
Panel D. Less Than 10 Years Since Left Company 
Mean 0.0007 0.0095** 0.0028 0.0025 0.0067* 0.0058 
t-statistic (df = 19) (0.09) (1.88) (0.89) (0.60) (1.44) (0.98) 
Panel E. More Than 10 Years Since Left Company 
Mean 0.0042 0.0209** 0.0026 0.0139** 0.0183** 0.0117 
t-statistic (df = 14) (0.33) (2.27) (0.47) (1.80) (1.98) (1.07) 
Panel F. Difference Between Panels D and E 
Mean -0.0035 -0.0114 0.0002 -0.0113 -0.0116 -0.0058 
t-statistic (21.0 < df < 22.9)  (-0.25) (-1.08) (0.04) (-1.29) (-1.12) (-0.47) 
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Table 8 - Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Vote Margin 
Table 8 lists the CARs for various time windows and is subdivided by dummy variables corresponding to the vote 
margin in the Senate confirmation vote. Please note that not every non-Cabinet nominee requires a Senate note in 
order to be confirmed. Those nominees were excluded. For clarification on interpreting the windows or the CARs, 
please see the description for Table 4. 
Panel A lists the CARs and p-values for those who were confirmed by a margin of 10 votes or fewer. Panel B lists 
the opposite, and Panel C tests for a statistically significant difference between Panels A and B using Welch’s t-test. 
Panel D lists the mean CARs and corresponding p-values for those confirmed by a margin of 20 or fewer votes. 
Panel E lists the opposite, and Panel F tests for a difference between these means using Welch’s t-test. T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
 
 CAR(-5,5) CAR(-2,2) CAR(-2,-1) CAR(0,1) CAR(0,2) CAR(0,5) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Panel A. Vote Margin of 10 or Fewer Votes 
Mean 0.0231 0.0420*** 0.0025 0.0330** 0.0395*** 0.0218 
t-statistic (df = 5) (1.06) (7.68) (0.30) (2.88) (4.02) (1.42) 
Panel B. Vote Margin of More Than 10 Votes 
Mean -0.0026 0.0096* -0.0002 0.0028 0.0098* 0.0087 
t-statistic (df = 21) (-0.33) (1.62) (-0.08) (0.61) (1.64) (1.10) 
Panel C. Difference Between Panels A and B 
Mean 0.0257 0.0324*** 0.0027 0.0302** 0.0297** 0.0132 
t-statistic (6.3 < df < 17.7) (1.10) (4.03) (0.31) (2.45) (2.58) (0.76) 
Panel D. Vote Margin of 20 or Fewer Votes 
Mean 0.0100 0.0158** 0.0007 0.0087 0.0151** 0.0171** 
t-statistic (df = 14) (0.94) (2.10) (0.17) (1.13) (1.86) (1.86) 
Panel E. Vote Margin of More Than 20 Votes 
Mean -0.0052 0.0173** -0.0001 0.0099* 0.0173** 0.0050 
t-statistic (df = 12) (-0.46) (2.16) (-0.02) (1.67) (2.21) (0.47) 
Panel F. Difference Between Panels D and E 
Mean 0.0062 -0.0015 0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0022 0.0122 
t-statistic (24.9 < df < 26.0) (0.98) (-0.13) (0.14) (-0.12) (-0.20) (0.87) 
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Table 9 – Multivariate Test: All Variables of Interest 
This table (continued on the next page) reports the results from estimating the following equation using all 
observations and all variables of interest that were found to increase predictive power of the model. Variables were 
added, a few at a time, from the base model, which contained those variables most predictive of CARs.  
CAR-2,2 = ß0 + ß1(Volume) + ß2(LogMktCap) + ß3(Board) + ß4(Cabinet) + ß5(YearsSince) + ß6(Board * Cabinet) + 
ß7(C_Level) + ß8(VoteDifLessThan10) +  
The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return for the most statistically significant window across all 
samples, the 5-day window commencing 2 days prior to the announcement up through 2 days after the 
announcement. The independent variables of interest include: Volume, the trade volume in millions of shares on the 
announcement date; LogMktCap, the natural logarithm of total market capitalization; Board, a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the nominee served on the board of directors for the firm in question; Cabinet, a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the nomination was for a Cabinet position; YearsSince, an integer measure of how many years have passed 
since they worked for the firm in question up through the announcement date; Board * Cabinet, an interaction term 
between being a board member and a Cabinet member; C_Level, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the nominee 
worked as a c-suite executive at some point in their time with the firm; VoteDifLessThan10,  a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the margin of confirmation (votes for minus votes against in the Senate confirmation vote) was 10 votes 
or fewer; Price, which is the price of one share of the firm’s stock at the close of the announcement date; Spread, 
which is equal to (Ask – Bid) / ((Ask + Bid) / 2) [Ask and Bid are defined in Table 1]; and Volatility, which is 
calculated as the natural log of AskHi minus the natural log of BidLo [AskHi and BidLo are also defined in Table 1]. 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 - cont. 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Volume .041* 
(1.97) 
.037* 
(1.79) 
.037* 
(1.84) 
.045* 
(1.96) 
.039 
(1.67) 
 
LogMktCap -1.602*** 
(-3.33) 
-1.552*** 
(-3.25) 
-1.067* 
(-1.97) 
-1.419* 
(-2.02) 
-1.051 
(-1.37) 
 
Board 2.479*** 
(3.02) 
3.779*** 
(2.88) 
3.726** 
(2.31) 
3.421* 
(1.93) 
3.554* 
(2.02) 
 
Cabinet 3.286*** 
(4.26) 
4.247*** 
(3.94) 
4.163*** 
(3.52) 
3.789*** 
(2.90) 
3.905*** 
(3.01) 
 
YearsSince .079 
(1.64) 
.094* 
(1.92) 
.089 
(1.63) 
.098 
(1.57) 
.102 
(1.64) 
 
Board*Cabinet  -1.928 
(-1.26) 
-1.958 
(-1.16) 
-1.487 
(-0.81) 
-2.038 
(-1.08) 
 
C_Level   -0.209 
(-0.22) 
.082 
(.08) 
-.154 
(-0.14) 
 
VoteDifLessThan10   2.349** 
(2.29) 
2.356** 
(2.21) 
2.180* 
(2.04) 
 
Price    .006 
(0.50) 
.000 
(0.22) 
 
Spread    -.510 
(-0.53) 
-1.679 
(-1.19) 
 
Volatility     .928 
(1.13) 
 
Intercept 13.755** 
(2.72) 
12.388** 
(2.42) 
6.987 
(1.21) 
10.445 
(1.40) 
5.864 
(0.70) 
 
Adjusted R2 .480 .491 .562 .529 .537 
 
  
  
32 
Table 10 - Multivariate Test: All Variables of Interest, Robust Standard Errors 
This table reports the results from Table 9 but with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively. 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Volume .041*** 
(4.08) 
 
.037*** 
(3.41) 
.037*** 
(3.65) 
.045*** 
(3.67) 
.039** 
(2.65) 
LogMktCap -1.602*** 
(-3.67) 
 
-1.552*** 
(-3.59) 
-1.067* 
(-1.85) 
1.419* 
(-1.82) 
-1.051 
(-1.34) 
Board 2.479*** 
(2.94) 
3.779*** 
(2.86) 
3.726** 
(2.76) 
3.421** 
(2.15) 
3.554** 
(2.20) 
 
Cabinet 3.286*** 
(4.06) 
4.247*** 
(4.08) 
4.163*** 
(3.79) 
3.789*** 
(3.31) 
3.905*** 
(3.12) 
 
YearsSince .079** 
(2.43) 
.094** 
(2.42) 
.089** 
(2.11) 
.098 
(1.69) 
.102 
(1.63) 
 
Board*Cabinet  -1.928 
(-1.19) 
-1.958 
(-1.25) 
-1.487 
(-0.87) 
-2.038 
(-1.16) 
 
C_Level   -0.209 
(-0.23) 
.082 
(0.07) 
-.154 
(-0.13) 
 
VoteDifLessThan10   2.349** 
(2.47) 
2.356** 
(2.40) 
2.180** 
(2.42) 
 
Price    .006 
(0.52) 
.000 
(0.21) 
 
Spread    -.510 
(-0.78) 
-1.679 
(-1.48) 
 
Volatility     .928 
(1.00) 
 
Intercept 13.755*** 
(3.09) 
12.388*** 
(2.85) 
6.987 10.445 
(1.45) 
5.864 
(0.78) 
 
Adjusted R2 .480 .491 .562 .529 .537 
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Table 11 - Multivariate Test: All Variables of Interest Except VoteDifLessThan10 
This table reports the results from estimating the following equation using all observations and all variables of interest 
in Table 9 except VoteDifLessThan10.  
CAR-2,2 = ß0 + ß1(Board) + ß2(Cabinet) + ß3(Board * Cabinet) + ß4(YearsSince) + ß5(C_Level) + ß6(Volume) + 
ß7(LogMktCap) +    
The dependent variable and all independent variables have the same interpretations and definitions as listed in Table 
9. T-statistics are reported in parentheses and do not use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Board 
1.622* 
(1.80) 
2.506* 
(1.73) 
3.763** 
(2.20) 
4.102** 
(2.66) 
3.485** 
(2.10) 
 
Cabinet 
2.742*** 
(2.98) 
3.422** 
(2.69) 
4.365*** 
(3.59) 
4.266*** 
(3.90) 
3.825*** 
(3.26) 
 
Board*Cabinet 
 -1.446 
(-0.78) 
-2.002 
(-1.07) 
-2.188 
(-1.31) 
-2.012 
(-1.15) 
 
YearsSince 
  .130*** 
(2.79) 
.094* 
(1.87) 
.077 
(1.38) 
 
C_Level 
  .713 
(0.67) 
-.420 
(-0.42) 
-.278 
(-0.26) 
 
Volume 
   .038* 
(1.79) 
.037 
(1.59) 
 
LogMktCap 
   -1.632*** 
(-3.13) 
-1.419* 
(-1.82) 
 
Price 
    -.007 
(-1.03) 
 
Spread 
    -1.579 
(-1.16) 
 
Volatility 
    .560 
(0.80) 
 
Intercept 
-0.980 
(-1.13) 
-1.457 
(-1.37) 
-4.132*** 
(-3.05) 
13.306** 
(2.36) 
11.845 
(1.40) 
 
Adjusted R2 .202 .192 .3244 .475 .451 
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Table 12 - Multivariate Test: All Variables of Interest Except Cabinet, Board, and Interaction Between Them 
This table reports the results from estimating the following equation using all observations and all variables of interest 
in Table 9 except Cabinet, Board, and the interaction term between Board and Cabinet. 
CAR-2,2 = ß0 + ß1(VoteDifLessThan10) + ß2(Volume) + ß3(LogMktCap) + ß4(YearsSince) + ß5(Price) + ß6(Spread) 
+ ß7(Volatility) +  
The dependent variable and all independent variables have the same interpretations and definitions as listed in Table 
9. T-statistics are reported in parentheses and do not use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
VoteDifLessThan10 3.240** 
(2.75) 
3.182** 
(2.67) 
3.171** 
(2.59) 
2.814** 
(2.36) 
 
Volume  .045* 
(2.20) 
.059* 
(2.22) 
.059** 
(2.22) 
 
LogMktCap  -.603 
(-0.94) 
-.907 
(-1.17) 
-.955 
(-1.06) 
 
YearsSince   -.019 
(-0.33) 
-.000 
(-0.02) 
 
Price   .009 
(0.68) 
.002 
(0.16) 
 
Spread    -3.215* 
(2.02) 
 
Volatility    1.362 
(1.45) 
 
Intercept .956* 
(1.76) 
6.642 
(1.00) 
9.350 
(1.23) 
9.113 
(0.93) 
 
Adjusted R2 .196 .276 .2375 .304 
 
